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How the co-benefits of addressing climate change can motivate action across the world. 
 
It is traditionally thought that the public must be convinced of the reality and 
importance of anthropogenic climate change in order to take personal and political action. 
However, convincing the broad public involves overcoming powerful ideological obstacles
1-
4
, and in many places climate change is slipping in public importance
5,6
. Here we examined 
whether beliefs about the “co-benefits” of mitigating climate change7 can avoid these 
obstacles by motivating behavior in both those who accept climate change and those who 
are  unconvinced or unconcerned. We describe an integrative framework for assessing co-
benefits
8
, distinguishing sociological dimensions (e.g., pollution, disease, economic 
development), and community character (e.g., benevolence, competence). Data from all 
inhabited continents (24 countries; N=6059), showed that two types of co-benefits, 
Development (economic and scientific advancement) and Benevolence (a more moral and 
caring community), rivalled climate change importance in the strength of their 
relationships with motivations to act. These co-benefits showed effects independent of 
climate change importance beliefs, and showed similar effects for both climate change 
believers and skeptics. Communicating these co-benefits of addressing climate change can 
help motivate action on climate change where traditional approaches have stalled. 
Those trying to motivate widespread public action on climate change face two hurdles. 
The first is to convince enough people that climate change is real and important. The second is to 
move people from accepting its reality and importance to taking action, both in their own lives 
and in convincing their governments to act. A single strategy has typically been used to 
overcome both hurdles – present climate science and its consequences in convincing ways so that 
people become concerned enough to act
9
.  
This intuitive approach was initially very successful, but in many places progress has 
stalled or even reversed. Communicating climate change more clearly is failing to convert 
skeptics into believers
10
, and climate change is slipping down the list of public priorities in many 
countries
5,6
. This is strongly related to political ideology
1-4
, giving cause for pessimism – if 
addressing climate change requires a substantial number of people to shift their basic political 
ideologies, the prospect for success is bleak. 
In response, new approaches have attempted to sidestep these hurdles. One promising 
approach has been to highlight the “co-benefits” of acting on climate change7, referring to the 
wider benefits to the community that do not necessarily depend on halting temperature rise. For 
example, mitigation actions can reduce pollution
11,12
, which could be seen as desirable regardless 
of its climatic effects. Climate change action can support economic development through “green” 
industries
13,14
, which could garner support on the basis of economic considerations independent 
of climate change. Population health could benefit
11,15
, for instance infrastructure providing 
alternatives to cars (e.g., walking/cycling paths) could help reduce obesity-related diseases
16
. A 
further co-benefit involves community functioning, where acting to address climate change can 
contribute to a more benevolent (caring and moral) community
8,17
. 
A clear advantage of co-benefits is that they can be important both to people concerned 
about climate change and to those who are unconcerned or even skeptical – they do not require 
accepting climate science. However, two challenges remain for establishing their usefulness and 
effectiveness in motivating action. One challenge is that researchers have focused on single types 
of co-benefits, such as pollution or economic development, without an overarching framework to 
understand whether some co-benefits are related and which are most important to people. The 
second challenge is that while climate change requires a global solution, research on public 
reactions to co-benefits has predominantly been in Western countries (e.g., the USA
16
), and it is 
not clear whether cultures differ in the co-benefits that are most influential.  
Our research aims to address these challenges by providing an integrated framework for 
examining beliefs about a wide range of co-benefits, and by collecting data across all inhabited 
continents. By showing how people’s beliefs about co-benefits are related to their motivations to 
act across the world, the findings help researchers, policy-makers, and communicators 
understand how to promote the co-benefits of addressing climate change using the most effective 
global and local strategies. 
In our research, participants first indicated their beliefs about the reality and importance 
of climate change. Then, using a framework for understanding beliefs about the future of society
8
, 
those who believed climate change was real (“believers”) considered what their nation would be 
like in the future if action had successfully mitigated climate change. Those unconvinced that 
climate change was real (“skeptics”), for whom successful mitigation is not relevant, considered 
a subtly different scenario – what their nation would be like in the future if people had taken 
action aimed at mitigating climate change. 
After considering these scenarios, participants rated a wide range of possible co-benefits 
(see Supplementary Material) corresponding to four dimensions. Two related to society-wide 
issues: Development (e.g., economic development, scientific progress) and Dysfunction (e.g., 
pollution, disease)
8,17
. Two further co-benefits relate to the “character” of the community: 
Benevolence (whether people are caring and moral), and Competence (whether people are skilled 
and capable), which represent the fundamental dimensions people use to understand groups
18-20
. 
Participants could also indicate that these dimensions could worsen (e.g., lower economic 
development, greater immorality). These dimensions formed reliable scales (see Supplementary 
Materials), indicating the people see close relationships between some co-benefits (e.g., pollution 
and disease), although for skeptics a few scales were less reliable in some countries.  
These co-benefit dimensions were related to three scales assessing motivations to act on 
climate change
21
. The first focused on political action intentions (“citizenship”), such as voting 
for pro-climate politicians and contributing time/money to pro-environmental groups. The 
second involved “personal” domestic actions, such as conserving energy and green consumerism. 
The third measured financial behavior (“donation”), where participants were entered into a prize 
draw (150 US dollars in local currency), and volunteered an amount they authorized the 
researchers to donate to a pro-environmental organization if they won. 
Data were obtained from 24 countries spanning all inhabited continents and diverse 
carbon emission levels (see Supplementary Materials, Table S1). University student samples 
were selected to facilitate comparisons, as students occupy similar socio-economic positions 
across countries. In ten countries we also obtained community samples to establish 
generalizability. Using meta-analysis
22
, we calculated the average effect size (correlation) across 
samples, and the extent to which effect sizes varied across countries (Q-statistic). 
We first established the strength of relationships between co-benefits and people’s 
motivations to act, using climate change importance as a benchmark. We first focus on believers, 
as they were expected to show the strongest effects for climate change importance, providing the 
toughest test of the value of co-benefits. For student samples (n=3950), Figure 1 shows, 
unsurprisingly, that believing climate change is important had the strongest effect size across all 
action measures, although this effect varied significantly across countries. Critically, however, 
two co-benefits had effects of a comparable size to climate change importance. Development 
showed the strongest effects for citizenship and personal actions (although effects varied across 
countries), and a weaker effect for donations. Benevolence showed similar effects, which were 
more consistent across countries. 
These findings were replicated in the community samples (n=1213; Figure 2), which are 
compared with student samples from the same countries. In every comparison effect sizes in the 
broader community were stronger than for students, and for Development the average effect in 
the community was even stronger than for climate change importance. Together, student and 
community analyses demonstrate that beliefs about co-benefits relating to Development and 
Benevolence can be important for motivating people who believe in climate change to act. 
It is important to show that co-benefits have distinct motivational implications 
independent of believing climate change is important. Figure 3 shows effect sizes for co-benefits 
before and after controlling for climate change importance in both student and community 
samples. In all cases, controlling for climate change importance led to only minor changes in 
effect sizes, showing that co-benefit effects are independent of climate change importance, and 
thus can function as additional reasons for motivating action. 
These findings were also replicated for climate skeptics. Most samples included a small 
(and sometimes very small) skeptic minority, and to increase power we combined student and 
community samples, using correlations only from countries with at least 20 skeptics (14 
countries; n=896). Figure 4 shows effects for skeptics compared to believers (student and 
community combined) from the same countries. Effects were consistent overall, with 
Development and Benevolence again showing the strongest overall effects. For society co-
benefits, skeptics showed similar or stronger effects than believers, whereas for character co-
benefits skeptics showed similar or weaker effects than believers. Skeptics seemed particularly 
attuned to Development co-benefits, suggesting this should be focus of communication to this 
audience. 
Development, Dysfunction, and Climate Change Importance typically showed significant 
variation in their effects (Q-statistics) across countries. Meta-regression
22
 tested explanations for 
this variation. We included three country-level predictors on theoretical grounds: (a) climate 
change contributions (greenhouse gas emissions and renewable energy)
23
, indexing 
responsibility/culpability for climate change; (b) country wealth (GDP per capita), which has 
been associated with pro-environmental behavior
24,25
; and (c) the proportion of females in each 
sample, as women are typically more pro-environmental
3,26,27
. The basic correlations for student 
samples were used to maximize the number of countries analyzed. 
Summarizing findings (details in Supplementary Materials), wealth (GDP) explained 
significant variation in effects for climate change importance across the three behavior indicators, 
with effects weaker in poorer countries. However, these predictors could not account for the 
variation in effects for societal dimensions, with one significant relationship in 18 statistics, and 
exploratory analyses with additional variables showed no systematic effects. The reasons why 
Development and Dysfunction co-benefit effects vary across cultures remains to be established. 
A consistent story cuts across these analyses. Across the world, motivations to act on 
climate change were clearly related to beliefs about co-benefits, especially for economic and 
scientific development (Development), and in creating a more caring and moral community 
(Benevolence). For believers, co-benefit effects were independent of believing climate change is 
important, and rivalled climate change importance beliefs in strength. Skeptics showed effects 
similar to believers, and for skeptics Development was sometimes even more strongly related to 
action. 
These findings give cause for hope at a critical time, contrasting with the pessimistic 
implications of research suggesting people’s motivation to act on climate change are limited by 
ideology
1-3
, or relies on widespread personal experience of climate change
28,29
 (when it may be 
too late to mitigate). Communicating about co-benefits of addressing climate change can provide 
another way to engage and motivate the public to act, and to support government action, that do 
not depend on being convinced or concerned about climate change. For a worldwide audience, 
communicating about Benevolence co-benefits is likely to have the most consistent effects, but 
in some countries emphasizing Development may have greater impact (these countries are 
identifiable in Supplementary Materials). Communicating the importance of climate change may 
be effective to promote action in believers, but more so in richer countries.  
Communication about climate science and co-benefits should be complementary, not 
alternative, strategies. Moreover, co-benefits should be more than just a communication strategy 
– they should play incorporated into policy design and decision-making so that addressing 
climate change can deliver the broader benefits that the public values. 
Clearly, further research on co-benefits is needed. The number of climate skeptics was 
relatively small, and while community samples increased the generalizability of findings they 
were not as representative as large consortium- or government-funded surveys. However, the 
present research provides new perspectives not captured by such surveys. The consistency in 
findings across student and community samples, and for both believers and skeptics, gives a 
strong basis for inclusion in such large-scale surveys. Another important step is to identify how 
to communicate these co-benefits to the public most effectively. 
The prospect of mitigating climate change is greater when more people take action. Co-
benefits can motivate action independently of views on the importance of climate change, and 
even in climate change skeptics. Hence, focusing on co-benefits can be a viable strategy that 
avoids problems inherent in traditional approaches. Rather than scientists and activists insisting 
the public share their concern about climate change, the findings show the potential for 
connecting climate change to the social concerns of the public
30
.  
Methods 
Data were collected from 24 countries (24 student samples, 10 community samples) in 
the period of June 2013 to July 2014. Countries were selected to span geographic regions and a 
wide range of climate change contributions, based on the climate change score from the Yale 
Environmental Performance Index
23
. 
The survey was developed with feedback from country contributors for applicability and 
relevance prior to data collection. Participants completed surveys in the major language(s) in 
their country, with translations performed using translation-back-translation or parallel 
translation. Surveys were completed either online (18 countries) or on paper (6 countries).  
Participants first rated perceived climate change importance “Addressing climate change 
is one of the most important issues facing society today” (1 “Strongly disagree”, 5 “Strongly 
agree”), embedded among distractor items. Participants then completed a screening item asking 
whether participants (1) believed humans were contributing substantially to climate change, (2) 
believed climate change was occurring, but that humans were not contributing substantially to it, 
or (3) did not believe the climate was changing
17
. Those who chose (1) were directed to a 
scenario instructing them to think about their country in 2050 where people have taken action 
that has prevented significant climate change. Those who chose (2) or (3) were directed to a 
scenario instructing them to think about their country in 2050 where people have taken action 
aimed at preventing significant climate change. They then rated how different their country 
would be from today on society and character co-benefits, based on established scales
8
.  
After rating the future scenarios, participants rated environmental citizenship and personal 
(“private sphere”) behavior using established scales21, and the donation behavioral measure. 
Further details about samples and measures (including scale reliabilities) are contained in 
Supplementary Information.  
Analyses were conducted on participants who identified themselves as citizens of the 
country, and who identified as students (student samples) or non-students (community samples). 
All data meeting these criteria were included in analyses, except for a single extreme outlier in 
the Swedish skeptic sample. 
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*p<.05, **p <.01, ***p<.005 
 
Fig. 1. Meta-analyses showing average effect sizes and cross-country variability (Q) for climate change importance and societal future 
beliefs with motivations to act on climate change across 24 countries. 
“Citizenship” refers to public/political behaviors, “Personal” to domestic behaviors, and “Donation” is a financial behavior. 
Diamonds are average effect sizes, with bars showing 95% confidence intervals for the average effect. Climate Change Importance 
(white diamonds) serves as a benchmark for evaluating societal beliefs. The Q-statistic evaluates the extent of cross-country 
variability in effect sizes. Two beliefs about society’s future, Society Development and Character Benevolence, showed comparable 
effect sizes to Climate Change Importance across the behavioral measures. Q-statistics show that Climate Change Importance and 
Societal Development/Dysfunction varied in their effects across countries. In contrast, Character beliefs showed consistent effects 
across countries.  
 *p<.05, **p <.01, ***p<.005 
 
Fig. 3. Effect sizes and cross-country variability (Q) for community samples (N=10; black diamonds) and student samples from the 
same countries (white diamonds). Community samples (black diamonds) and corresponding student samples (white diamonds) showed 
similar effect sizes. Although differences between community and student samples were small, community samples showed larger 
effect sizes in every case. This is highly unlikely to be due to chance (Binomial test, p<.001), suggesting that effects in the community 
are as strong, or stronger, than for students in these countries. 
   
*p<.05, **p <.01, ***p<.005 
Fig. 3. Effect sizes and cross-country variability (Q) for societal future beliefs after controlling for climate change importance. 
After controlling for climate change importance ratings (partial correlations), effect sizes for each societal belief (black diamonds) 
showed only small changes from the original effects reported in Figure 1 (white diamonds). This shows that societal beliefs are 
largely independent of climate change importance in their relationships with motivations to act on climate change.  
   
*p<.05, **p <.01, ***p<.005 
 
Fig. 4. Effect sizes and cross-country variability (Q) for skeptics (14 countries; black diamonds) and believers from the same countries 
(white diamonds). Skeptics showed the strongest effects for Development and Benevolence, consistent with believers. Skeptics showed 
similar or stronger effects than believers for Society dimensions (but with variation across countries), and similar or weaker effects 
for Character dimensions. 
